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In this paper, we document whether and how much the equalizing force of earnings mobility has
changed in France in the 1990’s. For this purpose, we use a representative three-year panel, the French
Labour Force Survey. We develop a model of earnings dynamics that combines a flexible specification
of marginal earnings distributions (to fit the large cross-sectional dimension of the data) with a tight
parametric representation of the dynamics (adapted to the short time-series dimension). Log earnings are
modelled as the sum of a deterministic component, an individual fixed effect and a transitory component
which is assumed first-order Markov. The transition probability of the transitory component is modelled
as a one-parameter Plackett copula. We estimate this model using a sequential expectation-maximization
algorithm.
We exploit the estimated model to study employment/earnings inequality in France over the 1990–
2002 period. We show that, in phase with business-cycle fluctuations (a recession in 1993 and two peaks
in 1990 and 2000), earnings mobility decreases when cross-section inequality and unemployment risk
increase. We simulate individual earnings trajectories and compute present values of lifetime earnings
for various horizons. Inequality presents a hump-shaped evolution over the period, with a 9% increase
between 1990 and 1995 and a decrease afterwards. Accounting for unemployment yields an increase of
11%. Moreover, this increase is persistent, as it translates into a 12% increase in the variance of log present
values. The ratio of inequality in present values to inequality in one-year earnings, a natural measure of
immobility or of the persistence of inequality, remains remarkably constant over the business cycle.
1. INTRODUCTION
It is generally agreed that measuring earnings dispersion in one single year does not provide an
accurate picture of earnings inequality because forward-looking consumers can smooth transitory
earnings shocks to some extent. The economist interested in measuring interpersonal differences
in well-being can proceed in at least three ways: by studying consumption inequality directly—
but the scarcity of consumer panels renders this approach difficult to implement in practice;1
by emulating consumer behaviour and studying individual differences in long-run earnings av-
erages (usually, five- or ten-year means); or by decomposing individual earnings dynamics into
persistent and transitory components.
1. Yet see Cutler and Katz (1992), Attanasio and Davis (1996), Blundell and Preston (1998), and Krueger and
Perri (2001).
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The usual distinction between longer-run earnings inequality and earnings instability, or be-
tween persistent and transitory inequality, is at the heart of the approach theoretized by Shorrocks
(1978), which measures mobility by comparing the inequality in multi-year earnings averages
and annual earnings inequality.2 However, in a changing macroeconomic environment it is diffi-
cult to separate persistent inequality from transitory fluctuations. For this reason, several authors
have recently proposed to replace actual means by simulated means calculated on artificial data
generated using a parameterized model. The model is either estimated on a short period sup-
posed to be approximately stable (Flinn, 2002; Bowlus and Robin, 2004), or on a longer period
if the model specification encompasses both individual dynamics and structural change (Haider,
2001).3 In both cases, for a given year, longer-run measures of earnings are calculated holding
structural parameters constant at the level of that particular year. This allows documentation of
changes in the persistence of inequality—and the equalizing force of mobility—over time.
In this paper, we follow the literature and model log earnings as the sum of two factors, an
individual-specific fixed effect and a stationary stochastic component, with time-varying factor
loadings.4 However, while the literature essentially focuses on first- and second-order moments,
we aim at modelling the entire multivariate distribution of earnings in the most flexible way pos-
sible. Given an estimate of the full distribution, we are then able to simulate earnings trajectories
and compute longer-run measures of inequality. Our model is designed to fit the French Labour
Force Survey (LFS), a sequence of 11 large three-year panels from 1990–1992 to 2000–2002.
Contrary to other well-used panels like the Panel study of Income Dynamics (PSID), labour force
surveys such as the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), for example, typically
follow large samples of individuals over short periods of time. The model therefore combines a
flexible specification of marginal earnings distributions—to fit the large cross-sections—with a
tight parametric specification of the dynamics—adapted to the small time-series dimension.
The distribution of the individual effect is assumed discrete with many support points. This
allows us to use a simple expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm for estimation, the EM algo-
rithm being particularly well suited to the estimation of discrete mixtures. The marginal density
of the transitory component is a normal mixture, and in order to map the marginals into the
joint distribution of couples of consecutive realizations we use a parametric copula. We find that
Plackett (1965) one-parameter copula captures the year-to-year dynamics quite well. We also
model transitions between employment and unemployment by a Markov chain that is conditional
on the fixed effect.
The model being non-identified when factor loadings are allowed to vary freely over time,
we assume that they vary sufficiently slowly and smoothly for each three-year panel to face a spe-
cific set of time-invariant factor loadings. For each three-year panel, the model thus takes the form
of a mixture of non-linear first-order Markov models. The non-linearity renders identification dif-
ficult to characterize in a simple way. We, nevertheless, provide a set of functional restrictions
under which the distributions of the fixed effect and the transitory shocks are non-parametrically
identified. Identification holds assuming the injectivity of two non-linear operators. These
2. Moffitt and Gottschalk (2002) claim that five years is the minimal number of years for averaging earnings.
“A shorter lag would [give] a more distorted picture of the growth of permanent variances because short lags would be
contaminated by increasing transitory variances” (p. C72). For recent applications of this technique, see, for example,
Burkhauser, Holtz-Eakin and Rhody (1997), Burkhauser and Poupore, (1997), Maasoumi and Trede (2001), Aaberge,
Bjørklund, Jäntti, Palme, Pedersen, Smith and Wennemo (2002), and Van Kerm (2004).
3. Other examples of models of earnings dynamics with time-varying parameters can be found in Moffitt and
Gottschalk (2002), Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2004), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), Baker and Solon (2003),
and Guvenen (2007).
4. Thus, unlike Flinn (2002) and Bowlus and Robin (2004) our modelling allows for unobserved heterogeneity
(permanent components) in earnings.
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assumptions, as in most inverse problems, cannot be translated into simple properties of the
data-generating process.
Our model is closely related to Geweke and Keane (2000) first-order autoregressive model
with an individual-specific drift and another AR(1) transitory component. They adopt a flexible
specification (normal mixtures) for the distributions of transitory shocks.5 By comparison, our
model has a more constrained dynamic structure that is adapted to very short panels. On the other
hand, Geweke and Keane estimate a stationary model using 20 years of PSID data (1968–1989),
while our framework allows parameters to change with the business cycle.
We start by documenting changes in earnings inequality, and in earnings and employment
mobility in France in the 1990’s. We show that the first half of the period is characterized by a
simultaneous increase in earnings inequality, earnings immobility, and unemployment risk, and
the second half by a symmetrical decrease. As 1988–1990 and 1998–2000 correspond to periods
of fast growth and 1993 to a recession, business-cycle conditions appear strongly associated with
individual earnings dynamics. This structural instability justifies a model of individual earnings
dynamics with time-varying parameters. We then use the estimated model to simulate individual
trajectories for each year of the 1990 decade and compute measures of inequality of present
values (PVs) of earnings sequences of various lengths. Finally, by computing the ratio of the
inequality in PVs to earnings inequality in one cross-section, we document how the equalizing
force of mobility changed in the 1990’s.
We find that the permanent component (fixed effect) has a nearly Gaussian distribution. The
marginal distribution of the transitory component is leptokurtic, large shocks being much more
probable than for a normal distribution. Unemployment is an important source of inequality.
The variance of log monthly earnings increases by 9% between 1990 and 1995 and decreases
afterwards. In contrast, imputing Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits to unemployed workers
using a replacement ratio of 60%, the variance of log income in the whole sample increases by
11% between 1990 and 1995. Moreover, this increase is persistent as the variance of the log PVs
of lifetime earnings also increases by 12% in the same period, before decreasing at the end of
that period. Lastly, the equalizing force of mobility changed remarkably little over the period.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 precisely describes the model,
and Section 3 discusses its identification. Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 describes the
estimation method and presents parameter estimates, and Section 6 shows how the model fits
the data. Section 7 shows the main results of the paper, comparing cross-sectional and longer-run
earnings inequality in France in the 1990’s. Section 8 provides some model comparison exercises.
The last section concludes.
2. A MODEL OF EARNINGS DYNAMICS FOR SEQUENCES OF
LARGE, SHORT PANELS
We consider a series of short panel datasets S j , j = 1, . . . , J , with many individual observations.
Each subpanel S j records individual log earnings yit and individual attributes xit over a fixed
time length T :
S j = {(yit , xit ), i = 1, . . . , N , t = t j , t j +1, ..., t j + T −1},
where t j denotes the first observation date for panel S j . So t j represents the time at which in-
dividuals in S j enter the panel. For example, the LFS is a sequence of overlapping three-year
panels (T = 3).
5. Geweke and Keane (2007) extend their 2000 paper by permitting state probabilities to depend on covariates.
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We assume a standard formulation with three components, deterministic, permanent, and
transitory, as
yit = βt xi t +σtηi + exp(αt xi t )εi t , t = t j , . . . , t j + T −1, (1)
with parameters (row-vectors) indexed by calendar time t . There are two error components: ηi is
an individual-specific effect, and εi t is a strongly stationary idiosyncratic component. Both error
components have mean and variance normalized to 0 and 1, respectively, and factor loadings are
left unrestricted.
We complete the specification of model (1) as follows.
2.1. Observed heterogeneity
The vector xit of observed individual characteristics comprises experience, squared experience,
and five education dummy variables: primary education (I), some high school (II), high school
(III), some college (IV), and college graduate (V).
2.2. Unobserved heterogeneity/permanent component
We model unobserved heterogeneity ηi as a strictly exogenous random effect, with zero mean and
unitary variance, independent of xit for all t . We assume that ηi follows a discrete distribution
with K support points, η1, . . . ,ηK , with respective probabilities p1, . . . , pK . The c.d.f. of ηi is
thus
Fη(x) =
K∑
k=1
pk1{x ≥ ηk},
where 1{·} denotes the indicator function, with ∑Kk=1 pkηk = 0 and ∑Kk=1 pkη2k = 1.
The support points are chosen a priori to form a grid on R. In the application, we set ηk =
2−1(k/(K +1)), for k = 1, . . . , K . We also set K large enough, and thus the grid fine enough, to
approximate a continuous distribution well. The reason why we do not discretize the distribution
of ηi in the frequency domain, like a normal mixture for instance, is that modelling ηi as a discrete
variable will permit to exploit a simple EM algorithm for estimation.
2.3. Transitory component
We model εi t as a strongly stationary first-order Markov process with zero marginal mean and
unitary variance. The only non-stationarity in the transitory component of the log earnings pro-
cess that is allowed for is the dependence to experience via the variance exp(2αt xi t ). In addition,
the transitory variance depends on education.
The number of observation periods (T = 3) does not allow for a rich structure of state
dependence. However, the model can be quite flexible as far as the marginal distribution of εi t is
concerned because of the very large sample size (more than 30,000 individuals in each subpanel
of the French LFS; see Table 2). We thus use a flexible specification for the marginal distribution
of εi t , namely a mixture of M = 3 normal distributions. The c.d.f. of εi t is
Fεt (x) =
M∑
m=1
πmt
(
x −µmt
ωmt
)
,
with
∑M
m=1 πmtµmt = 0, and
∑M
m=1 πmtω2mt = 1.
In order to map the couples of marginal distributions of εi t and εi,t+1 into the joint distribu-
tions of (εi t ,εi,t+1) we use a copula. Copulas are popular in financial econometrics for modelling
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dependence structures.6 Formally, we specify the joint c.d.f. of εi t and εi,t+1 as
F(εi t ,εi,t+1)(x, y) = C(Fεt (x), Fεt+1(y)), (2)
where C denotes the copula. The copula is the joint c.d.f. of the ranks of variables εi t and εi,t+1
in their respective marginal distributions. One can think of standard matrices of transition prob-
abilities across earnings quintiles or deciles as discrete approximations of the copula density (the
second-order partial cross-derivative of the copula).
A copula representation (2) exists for any strongly stationary first-order Markov process,
and the copula is unique if the marginal c.d.f.’s Fεt and Fεt+1 are continuous (Sklar’s theorem).
The joint density of (εi t ,εi,t+1) is the product of the two marginal densities and the copula den-
sity. Compared to the standard decomposition of a joint density into the product of marginal
and conditional densities, the copula representation is thus useful to the extent that it permits
independent modelling of marginal distributions and dependence structures.
Copulas are widely used in finance to model correlation patterns, as, for example, default
correlation in credit risk models. Here, our use of a copula is motivated by the asymmetry be-
tween the large cross-sectional dimension of the French LFS and its small time-series dimension
(T = 3). A parametric copula allows us to tightly parameterize earnings mobility while keep-
ing marginal distributions flexible. This goal would be more difficult to achieve using an au-
toregressive moving average (ARMA) model, as the same parameters govern both the marginal
distributions and the dependence structure.
Interestingly, economic models do make predictions on the form of copulas. For example,
we derive in Appendix A, the particular form of the copula of consecutive earnings for a discrete-
time version of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) equilibrium search model. The steady-state equi-
librium earnings distribution depends on the distribution of firm productivity and search-matching
parameters. Yet, the copula only depends on the search-matching parameters, because individual
mobility is possible in a steady-state economy only insofar as individuals exchange positions.
After testing several popular copula specifications on the French LFS data,7 we selected
Plackett’s one-parameter copula (see Appendix B for details):
C(u,v ; τ) = 1
2
τ−1{1+ τ(u + v)− [(1+ τ(u + v))2 −4τ(τ +1)uv]1/2}, (3)
where (u,v) ∈ [0,1]2 are generic ranks. The copula parameter τ unambiguously indexes mobility
from more mobile (low τ ) to less mobile (high τ ). In particular, Spearman’s ρ is an increasing
function of τ .8 We specify τ as a function of calendar time and observed heterogeneity:
τt (xit ) ≡ exp(γt xi t )−1.
As an example, Table 1 compares the observed transition probabilities between two con-
secutive years to the predicted probabilities using Gaussian and Plackett copulas. The Gaussian
copula is implicitly assumed in linear autoregressive models with normal margins. We see that it
tends to underestimate the dependence in the middle of the distribution, that is, the probabilities
of remaining in the second, third, and fourth quintiles.9
6. Copulas were initially introduced by Sklar (1959). See Nelsen (1998) and Joe (1997) for references on copulas
in statistics and finance.
7. We tried Gaussian, Plackett, Frank, Gumbel, Joe, Clayton, FGM, and Log copulas.
8. Let X and Y be two random variables with c.d.f.’s FX and FY , respectively. Spearman’s ρ, or rank’s correlation,
is given by ρ = Corr(FX (X), FY (Y )).
9. In order to compute the transition probabilities in Table 1 we first regress log earnings on experience and
experience squared. We then compute earnings ranks using the empirical c.d.f. of log earnings residuals. Finally, we
estimate the copula parameters by maximum likelihood, and compute transition probabilities.
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TABLE 1
Fit of 1990–1991 transition probabilities across earnings quintiles
Observed Gaussian Plackett
0·68 0·21 0·08 0·03 0·00 0·66 0·25 0·08 0·01 0·00 0·73 0·20 0·04 0·02 0·01
0·20 0·50 0·22 0·06 0·02 0·25 0·37 0·26 0·11 0·01 0·20 0·52 0·21 0·05 0·02
0·07 0·21 0·47 0·20 0·05 0·08 0·26 0·32 0·26 0·08 0·04 0·21 0·50 0·21 0·04
0·03 0·06 0·19 0·53 0·19 0·01 0·11 0·26 0·37 0·25 0·02 0·05 0·21 0·52 0·20
0·02 0·02 0·04 0·18 0·74 0·00 0·01 0·08 0·25 0·66 0·01 0·02 0·04 0·20 0·73
2.4. Unemployment
We also need to model transitions from and into unemployment. This is important for any rea-
sonable description of labour market trajectories in France where unemployment rates are chron-
ically above or around 10%. Let eit be the binary variable that is equal to 1 if the individual is
employed at time t and 0 otherwise. We assume that
ei1 = 1{δ0t xi1 + ζ0tηi + ξi1 > 0}, (4)
eit = 1{ρt ei,t−1 + δ1t xi t + ζ1tηi + ξi t > 0}, t=2,. . . ,T, (5)
where ξi1 and ξi t , t = 2, . . . ,T , follow independent standard normal distributions.10 All parame-
ters are indexed by calendar time t .
3. IDENTIFICATION
In this section, we first discuss the identification of the time-dependent variance and covari-
ance/copula parameters. Then, we discuss the non-parametric identification of marginal distribu-
tions of persistent and transitory components.
3.1. Structural change
Consider the following simplified version of model (1) without covariates:
yit = σtηi +ωtεi t , t = 1, . . . ,T,
Varηi = Varεi t = 1, Cov(εi t ,εi,t−1) = τt ,
where, to simplify the notation, we use the same symbol for the covariances and the copula para-
meters, τt . With T observations per individual, the number of parameters to estimate is 3T − 1
and the number of non-redundant data covariances, Cov(yit , yit ′), is T (T + 1)/2. Clearly, the
second-order parameters σt , ωt and τt are not identifiable from second-order moments if T = 3
(six moments for eight parameters). It is only for T ≥ 5 that the number of moment conditions
is greater than the number of parameters. Moreover, having several overlapping subpanels does
not help much. For example, with two subsequent three-year panels we have nine moments for
11 parameters.
To ensure identification, we thus have to restrict the way σt , ωt , and τt vary with time. Our
solution is to assume that structural change is smooth. We make this statement precise by as-
suming that σt ,ωt , and τt can be assumed constant within each three-year panel. That is, instead
10. Note that an alternative would have been to non-parametrically model the unemployment probabilities by edu-
cation and experience cells. However, this approach is difficult to implement when the number of support points for ηi
(K ) gets large, because of the usual curse of dimensionality.
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of indexing parameters on calendar time, we index them on the subpanel index j as σ j ,ω j , and
τ j . The cost of making this assumption is that individuals may face different structural parame-
ters in the same year t , depending on when they entered the panel (t j ). Alternatively, one could
parameterize the dependence of parameters on calendar time using polynomials, for example.
However, this would impose more restrictions across panels. In comparison, our preferred solu-
tion is simpler to implement and is reminiscent of the idea of using moving averages to smoothen
time series.
In practice, some additional smoothing is necessary. Our first attempts at estimating the
model with only panel index dependence resulted in rather imprecise estimates, yet displaying
clear patterns. Eventually, we chose the following specification:
• Parameters β j ,πmj ,µmj ,ωmj vary with j without restriction.
• Parameters σ j ,ζ0 j ,ρ j ,ζ1 j vary with j as cubic polynomials.
• For parameters α j ,γ j ,δ0 j ,δ1 j : the intercept and the parameters of education dummies vary
with j as cubic polynomials, while the parameters of experience and experience squared
do not depend on j .
3.2. Non-parametric identification of the stationary model
Let us now consider the stationary model
yit = ηi + εi t ,
with only three observations per individual (say t = 1,2,3). We assume that ηi is independent of
(εi t ). Let FX be a generic notation for the c.d.f. of a random variable X , with density fX = F ′X .
If (εi t ) is independently distributed, then the marginal distributions of ηi and εi t
are non-parametrically identified from the joint distribution of (yit ) (see Kotlarski, 1967). If (εi t )
is first-order Markov with C being the copula of (εi t ,εi t+1), then the following argument shows
how to reconstruct Fη, Fε, and C from the joint distribution of (yi1, yi2, yi3).
Start by assuming that the distribution of the individual-specific effect ηi is known. The
distribution Fε can be uniquely obtained by deconvolution, for example, under the assumption
that the characteristic function of ηi is everywhere different from 0. Then, consider the joint
distribution of (yi1, yi2):
Fy1,y2(x1, x2) =
∫
fη(z)C[Fε(x1 − z), Fε(x2 − z)]dz.
Suppose that the operator mapping C into Fy1,y2 given fη, Fε is injective,11 then one can
recover C uniquely given Fη. Lastly, consider for example the distribution of (yi1, yi3):
Fy1,y3(x1, x3) =
∫
fη(z)

 1∫
0
∂2C(Fε(x1 − z),v)∂1C(v, Fε(x3 − z))dv

dz,
where ∂1C and ∂2C denote the partial derivatives of C . Making use of the previous derivations
of Fε and C as functions of fη, this equation defines another inverse problem that has a unique
solution if the operator mapping fη into Fy1,y3 is injective.
The practical implementation of this identification algorithm is not trivial. We eventually
decided to use a flexible parametric model, with a discrete approximation for the distribution
11. The injectivity of this operator depends on properties of the distributions of ηi and εi t . Characterizing the
identifying assumptions at this deeper fundamental level is a difficult task that is outside the scope of this paper.
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of ηi , a mixture of three normal distributions for the distribution of εi t , and a parsimonious
specification of the copula C .12
4. THE DATA
The study is based on data drawn from the 1990–2002 French Labour Force Survey (LFS), con-
ducted by INSEE, the French statistical institute. This survey is a rotating panel, a third of the
sampling units (dwellings) being replaced, every year, by an equivalent number of new units. The
1990–2002 data contain 11 subpanels indexed by the date of entry of individuals, from 1990–
1992 to 2000–2002. Each subpanel has about 150,000 individuals aged 15 or more, in 75,000
households, which are thus interviewed three times, in March of three subsequent years, about
various aspects of their employment histories. We use LFS data instead of administrative earnings
data, as in Alvarez, Browning and Ejrnæs (2002), because the French register data (DADS) do
not follow individuals moving to public jobs, self-employment, or non-employment. Moreover,
administrative data contain limited information on individual characteristics.
4.1. Sample construction
Self-reported usual weekly hours worked are likely to be mismeasured. For instance, we notice
that many individuals alternatively report 39 hours worked in one week (the legal working time
in the 1990’s), and 40 hours in another. To limit the influence of measurement error in hours
on our results, we use monthly earnings rather than hourly wages. The employment status is
measured at the time of the interview as well as earnings. Monthly earnings are deflated by the
retail price index. We drop all earnings observations for students, retirees and self-employed
workers. We only keep male employment/earnings trajectories to limit the role of labour supply
as a determinant of earnings dispersion. Finally, we trim earnings below the first and above the
ninety ninth percentiles.
Geographical mobility, among other reasons, generates a significant amount of attrition.
Only 53% of the individuals of the sample have complete trajectories, 25% drop out after the
second year, and 22% after the first year. We assume attrition exogenous to the employment-
earnings process.
4.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows a few descriptive statistics. All reported quantities are weighted using the LFS
weights. The upper part of the table displays these statistics by calendar year, from 1990 to 2000.
We see that the French working population is slightly ageing between 1990 and 2002 and is also
becoming more educated. The log earnings variance increases from 0·171 in 1990 to 0·186 in
1996, and returns to 0·178 in 2000. The amplitude of the increase is 8·8%. The unemployment
rate (in the sample) sharply increases at the beginning of the period, from 9·5% in 1991 to 14·1%
in 1994, then remains roughly constant between 1994 and 1999, and drops to 11·6% in 2000.
The lower part of the table completes the description by showing statistics by date of entry
in the panel: from 1990(−1992) to 2000(−2002).13 We document average earnings growth and
relative earnings immobility, as measured by Spearman’s ρ (rank’s correlation), over one or two
12. Our estimation results will show that when we increase the number of support points for the distribution of ηi ,
the estimated discrete distribution apparently converges to a continuous limit (see Figure 1).
13. All individuals in the 1990 cross-section are treated as individuals entering the panel in 1990 because, in the
estimation, we are not estimating separate parameters for the 1988 and 1989 cohorts, earnings data being measured by
interval before 1990. A proper treatment of the cohorts of individuals entering the LFS panel before 1990 would have
thus required a more complicated model.
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FIGURE 1
Distribution of unobserved heterogeneity, ηi , for different values of K , the number of support points
years. Earnings mobility clearly decreases in the first half of the decade and increases in the
second half.
Overall, the first half of the 1990’s is thus characterized by a simultaneous increase in earn-
ings inequality, earnings immobility and unemployment risk, and the second half by a symmetri-
cal decrease.
5. ESTIMATION RESULTS
The true value of the unobserved heterogeneity component ηi being equal to ηk with probability
pk , the likelihood for one individual observation is a discrete mixture. We take advantage of this
property in the estimation to develop a sequential variant of the EM algorithm that is detailed in
Appendix C. Using arguments similar to Arcidiacono and Jones (2003), this estimation procedure
can be shown to deliver a consistent estimator of the model’s parameters, asymptotically equiv-
alent to a GMM estimator. This algorithm is very simple to implement but is slow to converge,
as usually are EM-type algorithms. It delivers, as a by-product of the estimation, the posterior
probabilities of unknown types ηk , which can be used to simulate individual trajectories.
In the remainder of this section, we present the parameter estimates that the EM algorithm
delivers for all subpanels 1990–1992 to 2000–2002.
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TABLE 3
Parameter estimates for subpanel 1990–1992
Log earnings Unemployment
Mean Volatility Mobility Initial Transition
(β,σ ) (α) (γ ) (δ0,ζ0) (δ,ρ,ζ1)
Expe 0·03776
(0·00112) −0·01172(0·0191)
0·06154
(0·00713) −0·1104(0·00351)
−0·05234
(0·00538)
(100×) Expe2 −0·06113
(0·00237)
0·07065
(0·0380) −0·04738(0·0144)
0·2154
(0·00751) 0·1049(0·0110)
Educ II 0·1850
(0·00808) 0·1206(0·187) 0·1026(0·0462) −0·5928(0·0259)
−0·2576
(0·0347)
Educ III 0·4269
(0·0104) 0·7416(0·194) 0·7007(0·0586) −0·8137(0·0374)
−0·4092
(0·0518)
Educ IV 0·5869
(0·0137) 0·5230(0·264) 0·6368(0·0766) −1·282(0·0636)
−0·4968
(0·0770)
Educ V 0·8952
(0·0134) 1·086(0·206) 0·9898(0·0747) −1·315(0·0633)
−0·6853
(0·0863)
ηi 0·2304(0·00321) – – −0·7775(0·0137)
−0·3334
(0·0167)
ei,t−1 – – – – 1·744(0·0384)
Constant 8·173
(0·0130) −3·486(0·266)
1·107
(0·0869) −0·1165(0·0354)
−1·115
(0·0612)
Notes: educ, education; expe, experience.
5.1. Distribution of unobserved heterogeneity
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the individual effect ηi for different choices of support. We
draw the density of the standard normal distribution for comparison. There is clear evidence of a
“convergence” of the distribution of ηi to a continuous density when K increases. Moreover, this
density resembles a standard normal density. This finding is consistent with what Horowitz and
Markatou (1996) found for the U.S., using a model with an individual-specific effect and i.i.d.
transitory shocks. It is also consistent with the idea that the unobserved heterogeneity component
aggregates many missing individual characteristics.
5.2. Effects of covariates
Table 3 displays parameter estimates for subpanel 1990–1992, all other subpanels yielding simi-
lar estimates. Asymptotic S.E.’s are given in parentheses.14
The mean log earnings is concave in experience, with a maximum at 31 years. The cop-
ula parameter is monotonically increasing in experience, and so relative mobility decreases with
experience. The relation between unemployment risk and experience is U-shaped, with a min-
imum at 25 years of experience. This is true for the initial probability of being unemployed as
well as for the transition probabilities into unemployment. Lastly, the log earnings volatility (i.e.
the variance of the transitory component) is U-shaped in experience: it initially decreases with
experience, and starts to increase after eight years.
Education has an increasing effect on the mean log earnings and the log earnings volatil-
ity, and a decreasing effect on mobility and unemployment risk. The unobserved heterogeneity
component ηi has the same effects as education. Lastly, the strong positive effect of eit−1 on
eit shows that the employment status is highly persistent, even after accounting for unobserved
heterogeneity.
14. We report the asymptotic S.E.’s of the last EM step before numerical convergence, that is, taking the prior
probability of each heterogeneity type as given. These are thus likely to be understated.
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FIGURE 2
Density of εi t for subpanel 1990–1992
On Figure 2 we draw the density of εi t . We observe that the distribution is highly non-
normal, displaying a very peaked mode and some skewness to the left. This visual impression
is confirmed by the skewness and kurtosis values equal to 0·26 and 7·5, respectively. The non-
normality of transitory shocks εi t contrasts with the near-normality of the permanent component
ηi . Using a much longer panel, Geweke and Keane (2000) also find strong evidence of leptokurtic
transitory shocks (but they constrain individual-specific effects to be Gaussian).
5.3. Changes across subpanels
The left panel in Figure 3 shows the evolution of the variance of the deterministic component of
log earnings, that is, Var(β j xi t ). It increases from 0·070 in 1990–1992 to 0·081 in 1995–1997
(a 16% increase), and returns to its initial level in 2000–2002.
In Table 4 we report the results of an Oaxaca decomposition, taking 1990–1992 as reference.
The contribution of age and education to the log earnings variance (row labelled “composition
effects” in the Table) increases in France in the 1990’s because the average age and education
of the labour force increase in this period (see Table 2). Composition effects account for six
percentage points (out of 16) of the rise of the log earnings variance between 1990–1992 and
1995–1997. Allowing returns to education to change (in the second row), the variance decreases.
This is because returns to education decrease in France in the 1990’s (see Figure 4). At the same
time, returns to experience increase very steeply during the first half of the 1990’s (30%) and
compensate for some of the variance reduction due to lower returns to education.15
The central and right panels in Figure 3 display the evolution of two key parameters, that
we shall refer to as the permanent and transitory components of the log earnings variance. The
first parameter is σ 2j , and is approximately equal to the variance of the effect of unobserved
heterogeneity ηi on log earnings.16 The second parameter is the average volatility, namely the
15. The effect of experience on the mean log earnings is quadratic in the model, so the return to experience is linear
in experience. The mean return in the sample is reported on the right panel of Figure 4.
16. The variance of ηi in the sample of employed workers is not exactly equal to 1 because unemployment risk also
depends on xit and ηi , and, therefore, the sample of employed workers, for whom we observe earnings, is endogenously
selected.
c© 2009 The Review of Economic Studies Limited
BONHOMME & ROBIN EQUALIZING FORCE OF EARNING MOBILITY 75
FIGURE 3
Decomposition of the cross-sectional variance of log earnings, subpanels 1990–1992 to 2000–2002
TABLE 4
Oaxaca decomposition of the deterministic component of the variance of log
earnings (reference = 1990–1992)
1990 1993 1995 1997 2000
Composition effects 0·0700 0·0704 0·0741 0·0734 0·0742
+ Returns to education 0·0700 0·0700 0·0733 0·0696 0·0666
+ Returns to experience 0·0700 0·0699 0·0807 0·0755 0·0698
mean of exp(2α j xi t ) (the square of exp(α j xi t )). Figure 3 shows that the deterministic, perma-
nent and transitory components respectively account for about 40%, 30% and 30% of the log
earnings variance. Moreover, permanent and transitory variances follow opposite business-cycle
dynamics. While the permanent component increased by 20% at the beginning of the observation
period, to reach a peak in 1992–1994, meanwhile, the transitory component decreased by 15%.
In the 1993 recession, the effect of the permanent component is reinforced while the transitory
variance is reduced.17
6. MODEL FIT
In this section, we evaluate the capacity of the model to reproduce the main features of the data.
6.1. Marginal earnings distribution and earnings dynamics in 1990–1992
Figures 5 and 6 compare actual and predicted distributions of log earnings levels yit and log
earnings residuals uit = yit − β j xi t for 1990–1992.18 In Figure 5, we separately consider the
distribution of levels, yit , the distributions of first and second differences, yit − yit−1 and yit −
yit−2, and the distribution of three-year averages, (yit + yit+1 + yit+2)/3. Figure 6 repeats this
comparison study for residuals. Overall, the fit is good although the model does not fully succeed
17. Baker and Solon (2003) find, using Canadian tax records, that both persistent and transitory variances increased
during the recessions of 1982–1983 and 1991–1992. Haider (2001), using U.S. data from the PSID for the period 1967–
1991, finds that the transitory variance increased more during recessions. In comparison, our results could point at a
special nature of the 1993 recession in France. However, given the lack of studies covering the period post-1990, it is
hard to say how specific to the French context our results are.
18. We predicted these distributions by simulation, using parameters estimated on the subpanel 1990–1992. This
requires to simulate transitory shocks from the copula model. We briefly explain how this can be done at the end of
Appendix B.
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FIGURE 4
Average returns to education and experience
FIGURE 5
Fit of the marginal distributions of log earnings levels (subpanel 1990–1992)
in capturing the peak of the distribution of second differences. Moreover, comparing the upper
left and lower right panels on the two figures shows that the additive structure of the model fails
to fit the skewness of log earnings precisely, though the full distribution of log earnings residuals
is very well fitted.
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FIGURE 6
Fit of the marginal distribution of log earnings residuals (subpanel 1990–1992)
TABLE 5
Fit of 1990–1992 transition probabilities across earnings quintiles
Actual Predicted
1990/1991 0·70 0·20 0·07 0·02 0·01 0·76 0·18 0·04 0·01 0·00
0·21 0·54 0·19 0·04 0·01 0·19 0·56 0·19 0·05 0·01
0·06 0·22 0·53 0·17 0·02 0·04 0·20 0·53 0·19 0·03
0·02 0·03 0·18 0·63 0·14 0·01 0·05 0·20 0·57 0·16
0·01 0·01 0·02 0·14 0·82 0·00 0·01 0·03 0·16 0·79
1990/1992 0·67 0·23 0·08 0·02 0·01 0·68 0·22 0·07 0·03 0·01
0·23 0·49 0·22 0·04 0·01 0·22 0·46 0·22 0·08 0·02
0·07 0·23 0·50 0·18 0·03 0·07 0·22 0·43 0·22 0·06
0·02 0·04 0·19 0·59 0·16 0·02 0·08 0·23 0·47 0·20
0·01 0·01 0·02 0·16 0·80 0·01 0·02 0·05 0·20 0·72
6.2. Transition probabilities in 1990–1992
Next, we consider the transition probabilities across earnings quintiles between t and t +1, and
between t and t +2. Actual and predicted probability matrices are displayed in Table 5. The fit is
there also quite good, despite a certain tendency to overestimate mobility in the upper part of the
distribution.
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FIGURE 7
Model fit, subpanels 1990–1992 to 2000–2002
6.3. Evolution, 1990–2000
Finally, we look at the capacity of the model to reproduce the observed changes in the log earn-
ings distribution, earnings dynamics, and unemployment risk across subpanels, from 1990–1992
to 2000–2002. The top panels of Figure 7 show how the model fits the variance, the skewness,
and the kurtosis of log earnings. The middle panels compare Spearman’s ρ for actual and simu-
lated log earnings dynamics over one and two years, and the variance of first-differences of log
earnings levels. The lower panels plot unemployment probabilities in the first year, and transition
probabilities from employment and from unemployment. Again, the overall fit is quite satisfac-
tory, although the central graph shows that the model underpredicts Spearman’s ρ two years
apart. It is likely that the model predicts too much mobility because of the first-order Markov
assumption. It will be important to keep in mind this caveat, due to the very short time length of
the French LFS, when interpreting longer-run inequality results in the next section.
7. LONGER-RUN INEQUALITY
With a fully parametric model in hand, we can now simulate individual earnings trajectories.
Specifically, we assign to every individual in the survey the parameters of the subpanel he be-
longs to. We then draw a value for the unobserved heterogeneity component ηi conditional on
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observations, using the posterior distribution of latent variables that the EM algorithm delivers.
Next, given ηi and given the first three employment/earnings observations at t, t + 1, t + 2 we
simulate employment/earnings trajectories after t + 2 until retirement at age 65. We simulate
transitory earnings dynamics using the parametric copula as explained at the end of Appendix
B. Lastly, we impute a replacement income to unemployed individuals equal to 60% of the last
earnings.19 For each individual who is unemployed in the first year, we draw his “last earnings”
from the equilibrium (marginal) earnings distribution.
For a given H , we then compute annuitized present values of finite sequences of H future
income as
Y Pit H =
Yit +βYi,t+1 +·· ·+βHit−1Yi,t+Hit−1
1+β +·· ·+βHit−1 ,
where Yiτ denotes year-τ income (earnings or unemployment replacement income), Hit =
min{H,65−Agei t } is the minimum of H and the remaining time before retirement, and β = 0·95.
Computing annuities is important in order to compare the present values of income sequences
of different lengths.20 When the horizon H is less than the subpanel length, Y Pit H is a sample
average.
Our approach extends the classical way of measuring permanent income to short panels by
simulating income trajectories beyond the observation period. Contrary to most microsimulation
exercises we predict unobserved heterogeneity conditional on observed earnings/employment
sequences, and this requires a fully parametric model. However, as the short length of the French
LFS forces us to restrict transitory dynamics to be first-order Markov, we expect simulations to
be less accurate for higher horizons because of possible specification errors. To allow for richer
individual dynamics, longer panels are required, together with a methodology that allows for
structural change within the panel time frame.
Table 6 displays the variances of log PVs, y Pit H = lnY Pit H , together with other inequality
indices (Gini index and 90/10 percentile ratio), for horizons H = 1,5,10,∞ years. In the re-
mainder of this section, we comment on these statistics, displaying them in graphical form to
make interpretation easier.
7.1. The contribution of unemployment to income inequality
We start by studying the impact of unemployment risk on income inequality. In Figure 8, we
compare the variance of y Pit H computed in two samples: the sample of workers employed in pe-
riod t “employees”) and the whole sample of both employed and unemployed workers in period t
(“whole sample”).
We expect workers employed in year t to face unemployment risk at future dates as all other
workers. But, as unemployment has long-lasting consequences, unemployed workers should have
lower income present values. In addition, unobserved heterogeneity determines unemployment
risk. Hence, the sample of employees in a given year is a selected sample as far as unobservable
(permanent) characteristics are concerned. These two effects together explain why there is more
current and longer-run income inequality in the whole sample than in the sample of employees.
In cross-section (H = 1), we find that the variance of employees’ log earnings is one third
less than the log income variance in the whole sample. When the horizon increases, the inequality
differential between both samples is reduced but never completely disappears (about 15% for
19. The average replacement ratio in France over the period is 60%, see Martin (1996). Note that we neglect several
important features, such as heterogeneity in the replacement ratio, non-stationary UI schemes and specific disutility of
unemployment.
20. In the rest of the paper, present values are always annuitized and we keep using the same shorthand PV.
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TABLE 6
Longer-run inequality for various horizons, 1990–2000 (replacement ratio = 60%, discount rate = 5%)
Year Whole sample Employees only
1-year 5-year 10-year Lifetime 1-year 5-year 10-year Lifetime
Variance of log
1990 0·2449 0·2012 0·1858 0·1753 0·1708 0·1594 0·1539 0·1512
1991 0·2435 0·2036 0·1869 0·1765 0·1728 0·1626 0·1569 0·1544
1992 0·2494 0·2064 0·1902 0·1791 0·1718 0·1622 0·1576 0·1552
1993 0·2621 0·2170 0·1991 0·1864 0·1792 0·1717 0·1670 0·1647
1994 0·2758 0·2259 0·2072 0·1943 0·1830 0·1745 0·1705 0·1694
1995 0·2720 0·2276 0·2085 0·1958 0·1849 0·1778 0·1717 0·1694
1996 0·2729 0·2258 0·2054 0·1913 0·1856 0·1758 0·1703 0·1677
1997 0·2748 0·2249 0·2048 0·1907 0·1858 0·1750 0·1690 0·1661
1998 0·2647 0·2180 0·1995 0·1877 0·1785 0·1702 0·1642 0·1622
1999 0·2659 0·2151 0·1954 0·1830 0·1778 0·1663 0·1600 0·1579
2000 0·2511 0·2060 0·1886 0·1784 0·1778 0·1655 0·1596 0·1575
Gini
1990 0·2689 0·2490 0·2416 0·2367 0·2409 0·2317 0·2275 0·2255
1991 0·2675 0·2499 0·2421 0·2374 0·2410 0·2332 0·2290 0·2273
1992 0·2686 0·2501 0·2429 0·2380 0·2390 0·2317 0·2285 0·2270
1993 0·2740 0·2558 0·2485 0·2433 0·2419 0·2369 0·2345 0·2333
1994 0·2792 0·2598 0·2526 0·2476 0·2435 0·2387 0·2368 0·2365
1995 0·2774 0·2603 0·2522 0·2470 0·2440 0·2400 0·2365 0·2352
1996 0·2796 0·2599 0·2514 0·2452 0·2453 0·2389 0·2358 0·2341
1997 0·2803 0·2594 0·2506 0·2444 0·2453 0·2388 0·2350 0·2332
1998 0·2755 0·2557 0·2472 0·2421 0·2415 0·2356 0·2317 0·2306
1999 0·2757 0·2538 0·2448 0·2389 0·2410 0·2335 0·2292 0·2274
2000 0·2708 0·2506 0·2425 0·2373 0·2424 0·2339 0·2298 0·2277
Percentile ratio, P90/P10
1990 3·323 2·954 2·836 2·782 2·826 2·714 2·638 2·633
1991 3·253 2·963 2·857 2·789 2·802 2·714 2·664 2·652
1992 3·459 2·994 2·893 2·843 2·799 2·708 2·684 2·687
1993 3·694 3·104 2·950 2·879 2·831 2·784 2·738 2·728
1994 3·905 3·173 3·012 2·950 2·916 2·797 2·782 2·779
1995 3·820 3·183 3·041 2·966 2·884 2·828 2·784 2·792
1996 3·833 3·203 3·022 2·940 2·834 2·787 2·749 2·770
1997 3·894 3·180 3·019 2·955 2·788 2·804 2·767 2·773
1998 3·845 3·116 2·954 2·902 2·729 2·766 2·722 2·736
1999 3·839 3·084 2·920 2·872 2·729 2·766 2·722 2·736
2000 3·482 3·022 2·880 2·858 2·855 2·745 2·689 2·710
lifetime earnings). The memory of the initial inequality does not vanish as the horizon increases,
despite the stationarity assumed in simulating trajectories.
The figure also displays the evolution of the log PV variance differential of employees vs.
all workers (employed and unemployed). It decreases at the beginning of the period, from 0·70 in
1990 to 0·66 in 1994. Thus, income inequality increases more than earnings inequality following
the 1993 recession, mirroring the increase in the unemployment rate. This business-cycle effect
vanishes in the long run.
7.2. The structure of longer-run income inequality
In this section we decompose the log PV variance into four components. The first one is the
deterministic contribution of differences in education and experience across individuals. It is cal-
culated as the between-group variance of y Pit H across education and experience cells. The second
one, called permanent, captures unobserved heterogeneity differences (ηi ). We compute it as the
within-group variance—by education and experience—of y Pit H simulated with transitory shocks
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FIGURE 8
Variance of log PVs of employees’ earnings as a proportion of the variance of log PVs of workers’ income in the whole
sample (replacement ratio = 60% and discount rate = 5%)
FIGURE 9
Decomposition of log PV variance as a function of the horizon in 1990 (replacement ratio of 60% and discount rate
of 5%)
set to 0 in order to cancel any source of persistence other than ηi . The third and fourth com-
ponents measure the contribution of transitory shocks. Because transitory shocks are persistent,
we decompose their contribution as follows. A first transitory component (simply called tran-
sitory) is calculated as the within-group variance—by education, experience, and unobserved
heterogeneity—of y Pit H simulated with i.i.d. transitory shocks, that is, setting the copula parame-
ter to 0. A persistent component is lastly computed as the residual variance.
Figure 9 shows the results for the year 1990. The deterministic and permanent components
both explain approximately 40% of the total variance of y Pit H for all H . Transitory shocks con-
tribute as follows. Initially, in cross-section, the transitory component accounts for 20% of the
variance. When the horizon increases its share rapidly decreases to 8% after five years and 5%
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after 20 years. In contrast, the share of the persistent component rises to 13% after 3 years, and
then moderately decreases to 10%. The total contribution of transitory shocks to lifetime income
inequality slightly decreases with the horizon and accounts for 15–20% of the total variance of
lifetime income PVs.21
Hence, the structure of longer-run earnings inequality remains very much constant after five
years. This is an interesting result, which shows that the use of five-year sequences goes a long
way towards capturing the distribution of lifetime PVs. Note, however, that the level of inequality
decreases steadily with the time horizon. Table 6 shows that the variance of log PVs computed
over five years is 82% of its cross-section value (0·2012 vs. 0·2449), while it decreases to 76%
over 10 years (0·1858) and 72% for lifetime PVs (0·1753).
7.3. Evolution, 1990–2000
In this section we document the evolution of longer-run income inequality over the 1990’s. Panel
(a) of Figure 10 shows the evolution of the variance of y Pit H in the sample of employees and the
whole sample, separately.
Longer-run inequality follows a similar hump-shaped pattern as cross-sectional earnings
inequality. However, the amplitude is significantly larger. For example, the variance of log PV of
lifetime income (H = ∞) in the whole population of both employed and unemployed workers
grows from 175 in 1990 to 0·196 in 1995—a 12% increase—and then returns to 0·178 in 2000.
For one-year income, the increase between 1990 and 1995 is 11%.
Panel (b) of Figure 10 displays the evolution of the variance of y Pit H in proportion to the
variance of y Pit1. As more mobility makes individuals exchange position more frequently, this
ratio is an index of immobility, and its evolution measures the changes in the equalizing force of
mobility over the decade (see Shorrocks, 1978; Fields, 2005). Two remarks are in order. First,
according to this index, there is much less mobility in the sample of employees than in the
whole sample. In the whole sample, the ratio of five-year and lifetime income inequality to the
cross-sectional variance ranges around 82% and 72%, respectively. In the sample of employees,
the immobility index is always close to 90%. The differences in the levels reflect the greater
homogeneity of the employees’ sample. The fact that the horizon matters less for the subsample
of employees is due to unemployment being a transitory state.
Second, and importantly, the equalizing force of mobility remains remarkably constant over
the decade. Indeed, in the whole sample the ratio of lifetime to cross-sectional income inequality
varies between 72% (in 1991) and 69% (in 1999). This near constancy is all the more noticeable
as all inequality indices follow a marked hump-shaped pattern.22 These results imply that cross-
sectional income inequality is already quite informative of the evolution of longer-run income
inequality, provided that unemployed workers are included in the base sample with lower imputed
replacement income.
8. MODEL COMPARISON EXERCISES
In this section, we perform two model checks: we test the sensitivity of the previous results to
unemployment risk, and we measure the consequences of non-Gaussianity and non-linearity in
the process of transitory shocks.23
21. Geweke and Keane (2000, table 11), using the PSID, regress the PVs of lifetime earnings on observables
and unobserved individual effects. They find that observable account for 20–35% of the variance of PVs, unobserved
individual effects account for 35–45%, and between 25% and 35% of the variance is left unexplained.
22. The Gini index gives a similar picture. However, being less sensitive to the lower tail of the earnings distribution,
the effect of unemployment is less pronounced.
23. We also evaluated the effect of neglecting unobserved heterogeneity on longer-run inequality. We found that
both the level and the persistence of inequality are then strongly understated.
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FIGURE 10
Longer-run income inequality (replacement ratio = 60% and discount rate = 5%)
8.1. Varying unemployment risk
We first study the sensitivity to unemployment insurance by varying the replacement ratio of UI
benefits between 40% and 80%. Given the UI legislation in France, these percentages can be
seen as conservative lower and upper bounds for unemployment compensation. Figure 11 shows
that lowering the replacement ratio from 80% to 40% has important effects on longer-run income
inequality. Inequality rises by about 25% (lifetime) or 60% (one year). The depressing effect
of the 1993–1995 recession is also more pronounced when the replacement ratio is lower, as
unemployment risk increases in 1993. Finally, the equalizing force of mobility is stronger, the
immobility index decreasing from 75% to 60% when the replacement ratio decreases from 80%
to 40%. This is because employment spells last on average much longer than unemployment
spells, making unemployment shocks to income intense but transitory.24
Second, we study the consequence of suppressing unemployment risk altogether. The re-
sults of this exercise are displayed in Figure 12. Lifetime earnings inequality increases by 11%
from 1990 to 1995, a close match to the 12% increase generated by the actual parameters.
So, cancelling unemployment risk has small effects on the evolution of the equalizing force of
24. Note that in the case where the replacement ratio is 40% the immobility index varies slightly more over the
business cycle, with a low in 1994 when the unemployment rate is highest.
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FIGURE 11
Longer-run income inequality for replacement ratios of 40% and 80% (whole sample)
mobility. However, we see that the level of inequality is now noticeably smaller (e.g. 0·155 vs.
0·175 in 1990), and that lifetime earnings inequality is more persistent (index of immobility of
about 80% instead of 72%).
8.2. Gaussian transitory shocks and copula
Most earnings models assume linear dynamics and Gaussian innovations. In our model, the tran-
sitory process (εi t ) is AR(1) if margins and copula are all Gaussian. We already established that
the distribution of the permanent component ηi is approximately normal, but that neither the
margins of (εi t ), nor the copula, are Gaussian. We now study the effect on longer-run inequality
of estimating and simulating a fully Gaussian model.25
Table 7 shows the parameter estimates. Compared with Table 3, we see that the Gaussian
model yields a very different decomposition of log earnings into deterministic, permanent, and
25. With Gaussian margins, the parameter of the Gaussian copula is also the autoregressive parameter of the AR(1)
model. We model it as τ j (xit ) = exp(γ j xi t )−1.
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FIGURE 12
Longer-run income inequality with no unemployment risk (whole sample, replacement ratio = 60% and discount
rate = 5%)
TABLE 7
Parameter estimates for subpanel 1990–1992, model with Gaussian margins and Gaussian
copula
Log earnings Unemployment
Mean Variance Mobility Initial Transition
(β,σ ) (α) (γ ) (δ0,ζ0) (δ,ρ,ζ1)
Expe 0·03369
(0·00112) 0·003746(0·0336) 0·02598(0·00186) −0·07973(0·00302)
−0·03773
(0·00518)
(100×) expe2 −0·05071
(0·00237)
0·04423
(0·0671) −0·03307(0·00351)
0·1566
(0·00649) 0·07755(0·0106)
Educ II 0·1607
(0·00807) 0·2389(0·391) 0·1633(0·0165) −0·4507(0·0226)
−0·1889
(0·0336)
Educ III 0·4378
(0·0158) 1·182(0·375) 0·4283(0·0163) −0·5630(0·0320)
−0·3057
(0·0497)
Educ IV 0·5624
(0·0137) 0·5444(0·559) 0·2997(0·0221) −0·9377(0·0534)
−0·4021
(0·0748)
Educ V 0·8976
(0·0134) 1·447(0·394) 0·4545(0·0172) −0·9491(0·0521)
−0·5345
(0·0816)
ηi 0·2965(0·00342) – – −0·1025(0·0106)
−0·07642
(0·0157)
ei,t−1 – – – – 20·033(0·0357)
Constant 8·215
(0·0130) −4·453(0·507)
−0·4010
(0·0258)
−0·1961
(0·0315)
−1·283
(0·0594)
transitory components. Indeed, the variance of the permanent component is σ 2j = 0·29652 =
0·088, compared to 0·23042 = 0·053, that is two thirds more. In the Gaussian model, the unob-
served heterogeneity component thus accounts for 50% of the variance of log earnings, compared
to 30% in the non-Gaussian model. As a consequence, transitory shocks have a smaller variance
and are much less persistent. Moreover, the Gaussian model predicts more state dependence in
employment (2·03 vs. 1·74 for the autoregressive coefficient in unemployment), but less depen-
dence on unobserved heterogeneity (compare the seventh row in the two tables). We checked that
the Gaussian copula, rather than the Gaussian margins, is mostly responsible for the observed dif-
ferences. Hence, the choice of the parametric copula used to describe dynamic tail dependence
does have important consequences on the estimation of the factor loadings.
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FIGURE 13
Counterfactual longer-run income inequality under full Gaussianity (replacement ratio = 60%, and discount rate = 5%)
Figure 13 shows the effect on longer-run inequality. On panel (a), we see that the Gaussian
AR(1) model predicts about 12% less inequality in cross-section. This is due to the fact that
unobserved heterogeneity determines unemployment less than in the non-Gaussian model. The
difference in terms of lifetime inequality is smaller, as the Gaussian model predicts about 7%
less lifetime inequality in the whole sample, and 2% more in the sample of employees. The
Gaussian model predicts an immobility index that is about five percentage points higher in the
whole sample. For employees, the ratio is close to 90% in both simulations. The evolutions
of inequality and immobility indices are also nearly identical. It is quite remarkable that two
models with such different decompositions of the log earnings variances yield so similar lifetime
inequality patterns.
9. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the evolution of cross-sectional and longer-run measures of inequality
in France in the 1990’s, a period characterized by significant business-cycle fluctuations. For
this purpose, we use the French LFS. In order to fit this type of data, we construct a model
that combines a flexible specification of the marginal earnings distributions (adapted to the large
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cross-sectional dimension) with a tight parameterization of the dependence structure (that the
small number of recording periods requires).
The model’s structure is standard, with an individual effect and stationary transitory shocks,
and we allow parameters to change with the date of entry of individuals into the panel. We
simulate individual trajectories beyond the observation period by drawing from the conditional
distribution given observations. The ratio of the inequality of long-run averages of earnings to the
inequality in a cross-section is an aggregate measure of the persistence of inequality. Thus, our
approach adapts an empirical methodology that previously required long panels to short panels
like labour force surveys.
The representation of log earnings as the convolution of several factors is standard in the
literature. The necessity of allowing for structural change (i.e. time-varying factor loadings) is
now recognized of utter importance. A few recent papers also point at non-linearities in the
process of transitory shocks. Our model has all these characteristics while still being simple and
interpretable.
We find that the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity component is approximately
Gaussian and the distribution of transitory shocks is leptokurtic. Relative mobility, as measured
by the joint distribution of the ranks of two consecutive transitory shocks (i.e. the copula), is also
non-Gaussian, and best approximated by Plackett’s copula. Unemployment risk and unemploy-
ment insurance are found to be an important source of permanent inequality. Despite significant
business-cycle fluctuations in earnings inequality, earnings mobility, and unemployment risk in
the 1990’s, the measure of the persistence of inequality (the immobility index) is remarkably
stable.
Moreover, a model comparison exercise shows that the parametric specification chosen for
the copula has important consequences on the estimation of factor loadings. A Gaussian copula
attributes to unobserved heterogeneity a greater share of the total log earnings variance. As, at the
same time, the unemployment process depends less on unobserved heterogeneity, the Gaussian-
copula model yields a very similar picture in terms of longer-run inequality. If, as our discussion
of identification suggests, the copula is non-parametrically identified, in the future it will be
interesting to push the analysis further and estimate a model with a flexible specification of the
marginal distributions of fixed effects and transitory shocks and the copula.
It will be also interesting to test the model on longer panels. The basic structure of the model
could be extended for that purpose. With four or five observation periods per individual, it should
be possible to identify and estimate a model with second-order Markov transitory dynamics, or
with an additional measurement error. Another interesting extension is to allow for an additional
individual factor governing the unemployment process specifically. The estimation algorithm
performs well and could easily be modified to incorporate these extensions.
APPENDIX A
A.1. Copulas: an economic model
The main structure of our model is a single factor model with first-order Markov errors. We model individual transitory
dynamics using copulas. In Section 2, we justified this choice by the ability of the copula representation to tightly
parameterize the dependence structure while being flexible as far as marginal distributions are concerned. In this section
of the appendix, we argue that modelling the law of individual earnings processes using copulas also arises naturally in
steady-state equilibrium models.
The prototypical steady-state search model describes an economy where a population of heterogeneous firms post
different wages, and where a population of homogeneous workers sequentially search for a job both when they are unem-
ployed and when they are employed. The wage offer distribution is some function F(w) that depends on the distribution
of productivity across different occupations and the search friction parameters. One can allow for heterogeneity in worker
ability by assuming that the labour market is segmented (see, for example, Van den Berg and Ridder, 1998).
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Search frictions are modelled as follows. Time is discrete. At the end of each period, an employee can be laid off
with probability δ or may draw an alternative earnings offer with probability λ. This alternative offer is a draw w′ from
the equilibrium distribution F . Employees accept alternative offers w′ strictly greater than the current wage w. In steady
state, the cross-sectional earnings distribution is related to the wage offer distribution by the one-to-one relationship:
G(w) = F(w)
1+κ[1− F(w)] ⇔ F(w) =
(1+κ)G(w)
1+κG(w) , (A.1)
where κ = λ/δ.26
Conditional on being employed at time t and t +1 (alternative offers thus accrue with conditional probability λ1−δ ),
individual wage dynamics follows a first-order Markov process such that
Pr{wt+1 ≤ w′ | wt = w} =
(
1− λ
1− δ +
λ
1− δ F(w
′)
)
1{w′ ≥ w}
= 1
1− δ
[
1− δ+λ
1+κG(w′)
]
1{w′ ≥ w},
where 1{w′ ≥ w} = 1 if w′ ≥ w and 0 otherwise. Hence
Pr{wt+1 ≤ w′,wt ≤ w} = 11− δ
[
1− δ+λ
1+κG (w′)
]
(G(w)1{w′ ≥ w}+ G(w′)1{w′ < w})
= 1
1− δ
[
1− δ+λ
1+κG(w′)
]
min(G(w),G(w′)).
The copula thus follows as
C(u,v) = 1
1− δ
[
1− δ+λ
1+κv
]
min(u,v). (A.2)
Hence, the steady-state search-wage-posting model naturally delivers a simple formula for the copula, which only
depends on the friction parameters δ and λ and not on the equilibrium wage distribution F . We do not use this specification
because it would not fit earnings mobility data well (as wage cuts are impossible). Yet, we want to put forward the
interpretation that a steady-state labour market can be characterized, first, by the equilibrium wage distribution G (i.e. the
marginal distribution of employees’ earnings), and, second, by a description of the way workers exchange positions (via
mobility rate parameters embodied in the copula C).
Now, the economy is clearly not in steady state. Structural parameters like G, δ, and λ do fluctuate over time. How-
ever, there is some evidence that steady-state flow conditions like (A.1) or the classical equality between the unemploy-
ment rate and δ/(δ +λ0), where λ0 is the exit rate from unemployment, are empirically well verified (see Postel-Vinay
and Robin, 2006; Jolivet, Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2006). This happens because net annual flows are small in relation to
gross flows. Over a limited period of time, macro trends can thus be neglected, and it seems that workers only exchange
positions. This is how we justify our assumption that each subpanel S j approximately reflects a steady-state economy
with a specific set of parameters.
APPENDIX B
B.1. The Plackett copula
Plackett (1965) generalizes the independence condition for contingency tables. He shows that, if U and V are uniform
random variables on [0,1], then the following equation:
P(U ≤ u,V ≤ v)P(U > u,V > v)
P(U ≤ u,V > v)P(U > u,V ≤ v) = τ +1 ∀(u,v), (B.1)
where τ > −1 is a given constant, has one single solution. This solution is a copula, and writes:
C(u,v ; τ) = 1
2
τ−1{1+ τ(u + v)− [(1+ τ(u + v))2 −4τ(τ +1)uv]1/2}.
26. See Burdett and Mortensen (1998). δ+λ[1− F(w)] is the exit rate from the stock of employees paid less than
w, which is proportional to G(w). The inflow is itself proportional to F(w).
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Equation (B.1) shows that τ is a natural mobility index. More precisely, let us define the following ordering c on
copulas, called the concordance ordering (e.g. Joe, 1997):
C1 c C2 iff C1(u,v) ≤ C2(u,v), ∀(u,v).
c is the first-order stochastic dominance ordering. It measures relative mobility: the ranks process governed by copula
C1 will be said more mobile than the ranks process governed by C2 if C1 c C2. Moreover, the concordance ordering
possesses a lower and a upper bound (Fréchet, 1935). The lower bound CL satisfies: CL (u,v) = max(u + v −1,0). The
upper bound CU satisfies CU (u,v) = min(u,v).
The Plackett copula satisfies the following properties (Joe, 1997):
1. C(·, ·; τ1)c C(·, ·; τ2) for all τ2 > τ1.
2. C(·, ·; τ) → CL when τ → −1.
3. C(·, ·; τ) → CU when τ → ∞.
4. C(·, ·; τ) → C⊥ when τ → 0, where C⊥(u,v) = uv is the independent copula.
Therefore, the Plackett copula is mobility decreasing with respect to its parameter, and the Plackett family covers
the whole range of bivariate dependence, from immobility (CU ) to independence (C⊥) and perfect mobility (CL ).
Simulation. Let u be earnings ranks at time t . For given u, we here show how to simulate earnings ranks at t +1
(v) from the Plackett copula. Note that for u ∈ [0,1] given, ∂C∂u (u,v) is uniform(0,1). So in order to simulate a v draw a
uniform(0,1) variable w and solve for v in ∂C∂u (u,v) = w. In the case of the Plackett copula, this implicit equation writes
as a quadratic polynomial equation with two roots in [0,1]. Choose the highest or the lowest root with probability 12 .
APPENDIX C
C.1. Estimation algorithm
Fix K , and a grid η1, . . . ,ηK for the distribution of the permanent component ηi , and fix M the number of Gaussian
components for the marginal distribution of transitory shocks εi t .
Let xi = (xi1, . . . , xiT ), yi = (yi1, . . . , yiT ), and ei = (ei1, . . . ,eiT ) be the observations for individual i . Let j (i) ∈
{1, . . . , J } be the index of the panel sample these observations belongs to (i.e. j (i) = j such that i ∈ S j ).
The likelihood for one individual observation is the discrete mixture:
 j (yi ,ei | xi ) =
K∑
k=1
pk j (yi ,ei | xi ,k), i ∈ S j ,
where
 j (yi ,ei | xi ,k) = P0j (ei1 | xi1,k)×
T−1∏
t=1
Pj (ei,t+1 | eit , xi,t+1,k)×
T∏
t=1
[
1
exp(α j xi t )
f j ((yit | xit ,k) | xit )
]eit
×
T−1∏
t=1
c
[
Fj ((yit | xit ,k) | xit ), Fj ((yit+1 | xit+1,k)); exp(γ j xi t )−1
]eit ei t+1 ,
where c is Plakett’s copula density, with parameter exp(γ j xi t )−1, and where
(yit | xit ,k) =
yit −β j xi t −σ j ηk
exp(α j xi t )
,
P0j (ei1 | xi1,k) = (δ0 j xi1 + ζ0 j ηk )ei1(−δ0 j xi1 − ζ0 j ηk )1−ei1 ,
Pj (ei,t+1 | eit , xi,t+1,k) = (ρ j ei t + δ1 j xi,t+1 + ζ1 j ηk )ei,t+1(−ρ j ei t − δ1 j xi,t+1 − ζ1 j ηk )1−ei,t+1 ,
f j (εi t | xit ) =
M∑
m=1
πmj f j (εi t | xit ,m) = F ′j (εi t | xit ),
f j (εi t | xit ,m) = 1
ωmj
ϕ
(
εi t −µmj
ωmj
)
= F ′j (εi t | xit ,m).
Note that we allow for a specific marginal distribution of transitory shocks εi t to each subpanel j .
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E-step. For initial values of the parameters pk , (µmj ,πmj ,ωmj ), (δ0 j ,µ0 j ), (ρ j ,δ1 j ,µ1 j ), (β j ,σ j ,α j ), and γ j ,
for each individual in the samples S j , j = 1, . . . , J , compute the posterior probabilities of the latent types of ηi and εi t :
p j (k | yi ,ei ,xi ) =
pk j (yi ,ei | xi ,k)
 j (yi ,ei | xi ) , k = 1, . . . , K ,
π j (m | yit , xit ,k) =
πmj f j ((yit | xit ,k) | xit ,m)
f j ((yit | xit ,k) | xit ) , m = 1, . . . , M.
M-step. With p j (k | yi ,ei ,xi ) and π j (m | εi t , xit ,k) set to these values,
• Update pk by maximizing
J∑
j=1
∑
i∈S j
K∑
k=1
p j (k | yi ,ei ,xi ) ln pk ,
with respect to pk and subject to
K∑
k=1
pk = 1,
K∑
k=1
pkηk = 0,
K∑
k=1
pkη2k = 1.
Then for each subpanel j perform the following steps:
• Maximize
∑
i∈S j
M∑
m=1
K∑
k=1
p j (k | yi ,ei ,xi )
∑
t/eit =1
π j (m | yit , xit ,k) lnπmj ,
with respect to πmj and s.t.
M∑
m=1
πmj = 1,
M∑
m=1
πmj µmj = 0,
M∑
m=1
πmj ω2mj = 1.
• Maximize
∑
i∈S j
K∑
k=1
p j (k | yi ,ei ,xi ) ln P0j (ei1 | xi1,k; δ0 j ,µ0 j ),
with respect to (δ0 j ,µ0 j ), and
∑
i∈S j
K∑
k=1
T−1∑
t=1
p j (k | yi ,ei ,xi ) ln Pj (ei,t+1 | eit , xi,t+1,k; ρ j ,δ1 j ,µ1 j ),
with respect to (ρ j ,δ1 j ,µ1 j ).
• Minimize
∑
i∈S j
K∑
k=1
p j (k | yi ,ei ,xi )(yit −β j xi t −σ j ηk )2,
with respect to β j and σ j . Then, compute residuals u(yit | xit ,k) = yit −β j xi t −σ j ηk and minimize
∑
i∈S j
K∑
k=1
p j (k | yi ,ei ,xi )[u(yit | xit ,k)2 − exp(2α j xi t )]2,
with respect to α j .
• Compute standardized residuals  (yit | xit ,k) and maximize
∑
i∈S j
K∑
k=1
p j (k | yi ,ei ,xi )
M∑
m=1
∑
t/eit =1
π j (m | yit , xit ,k) ln
[
1
ωmj
ϕ
(
(yit | xit ,k)−µmj
ωmj
)]
,
with respect to µmj and ωmj . The solution can be written as weighted means and variances of the standardized
residuals.
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• Compute ranks
r(yit | xit ,k) = Fj ((yit | xit ,k) | xit ),
and maximize
∑
i∈S j
K∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
p j (k | yi ,ei ,xi )
∑
t/eit =ei,t+1=1
lnc[r(yit | xit ,k),r(yi,t+1 | xi,t+1,k); exp(γ j xi t )−1]
with respect to γ j .
• Lastly, pooling all subpanels together regress the estimates of j-specific parameters on a constant, j , j2, and j3.
Compute the restricted parameter estimates, and start a new E-step. Iterate until convergence.
A STATA program is available from the authors.
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